Yesterday the Israeli government directly denied the London Sunday Times claim that it was planning to strike Iran with tactical nuclear ...   more »

Speculation is again rife that Israel will launch a strike against Iran in the near future to deter or eliminate that country's nuclear program.  The latest assessment in the Sunday Times, based on supposed leaks from the IDF, is a plan to hit the critical Iranian nuclear sites with tactical nuclear weapons.  The rationale is that only tactical nuclear weapons can devastate Iran’s deeply buried and heavily protected nuclear facilities. 

Most articles, including the Sunday Times piece, are based on an assessment of Israeli capability, rather than on the actual difficulties, both military, political and diplomatic, of Israeli action.  Does Israel have the capacity to hit Iranian sites accurately and effectively with tactical nukes?  Yes.  Will it do so?  No.  Here’s why.

There are about seven different possible scenarios for an Israeli strike on Iran.  Most obvious is a direct one time strike across Jordan and Iraq by Israeli fighter bombers.  Other conventional alternatives is a similar strike flown through Turkey, or over Jordan and Saudi Arabia, or lastly, down the Red Sea around Saudi Arabia and up through the Persian Gulf.  Each has its benefits and drawbacks.  Another theoretical alternative is a sustained attack operating from Israel, again with flights over Jordan and Iraq, and elaborate in-air refueling.  The last conventional option is a missile attack using Israel’s land-based Jericho 2 missiles without nuclear warheads.  Non-conventional options are a Jericho 2 nuclear attack, or as the Times article suggests, a tactical nuclear attack using Israeli aircraft. 

Working in reverse order here is why none is actually feasible.

Tactical Nuke Strike:  The tactical nuke strike scenario likely would be the most militarily effective.  For that reason alone it is not quite as unlikely as it might seem at first.  Its one strong point is that it is the only scenario which could reasonably wreck Iran’s nuclear program.  However, it is also by far the most politically and diplomatically troublesome option, which is why it will never happen.  First, the aircraft delivered nuke strike still presents all of the political military and diplomatic problems of a conventional airstrike, except that in the end it might actually succeed in destroying its targets.  That is, Israeli aircraft would still have to violate the air space of Jordan (with whom Israel has a peace treaty), Iraq (which is controlled by U.S. forces and for which the U.S. cannot allow Israel permission), or Turkey (which is a nominal Israeli ally but which has an Islamic government and which would never permit transit).  Secondly, the actual use of nuclear weapons, even if carefully and safely done, would instantly make Israel a pariah state, probably result in trade embargoes with its major trading partners, guarantee non-conventional retaliation (with chemical or biological weapons from Iran) and possibly and Islamic riposte with a nuke provided or launched by Pakistan.  Domestically, in Israel, the reaction would be just as volatile, and possible rend the country politically such that it became completely paralyzed.  Verdict:  Zero chance of happening.

Strategic Nuke Strike:  This option avoids the problems of transiting neighboring airspace, but does not offer the certainty of success of the tactical strike unless the Israelis use big nuclear bombs which means mass destruction and radioactive fallout across not only Iran, but neighboring countries downwind including Russia, Afghanistan (where there are many U.S. and NATO troops, Pakistan, and India (which is another nominal Israeli ally).   And if the wind blew westward, Israel itself. The international and domestic reaction to such a strike would be worse.  Verdict:  Less than no chance.

Conventional Missile Attack:  This avoids all the problems of violating nearby airspace and has none of the drawbacks of the nuclear options.  So why is this not the way to go?  Because it is militarily ineffective.  Israel’s Jericho 2 missiles armed with conventional warheads, lack both the accuracy and destructive power to do anything but annoy the Iranians, even assuming Israel has enough of them to even do that.  Nobody knows how many missiles Israel has, but unless there are about 1000 available and sufficient launchers for such an offensive (and there are nowhere near that number of either) this option is completely unfeasible.  Verdict:  No chance.

Sustained Conventional Attack Flying Over Iraq and Jordan:  Israel has the assets necessary to mount such an attack.  Most often mentioned are Israel’s 25 F-15Is and 60 F-16I fighter-bombers.  But the IAF has much more than that.  The IAF has at least 10 F-15Ds which are two-seat F-15s capable (and used by Israel) for bombing, and for which the IAF has conformal fuel tank add-ons to increase their range.  Israel also has over 30 F-16Ds which (about which all the same is true).  Thus, Israel has at least 125 long range strike aircraft available, and with aerial refueling, it probably could use scores of F-16C aircraft as a supplement if necessary.  If Jordan and the U.S. (which controls Iraq) would permit such an operation, the IAF could take its time, destroy Iranian command control and air defenses, scour the Iranian air force from the skies, and pound Iranian nuclear sites for several days.  However, neither the U.S. or Jordan will give permission.  Therefore…Verdict:  No chance.

Air Strike Down the Red Sea and Around Saudi Arabia:  This option has been bruited as a way to avoid all the problems associated with flying over Israel’s neighbors.  The aircraft would fly down the Red Sea, take a left at the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb, fly along the southern coasts of Yemen and Oman, then turn left again into the Gulf of Oman, and thence up the Persian Gulf into Iran.  The advantage?  You don’t violate anyone’s airspace but Iran’s.  The drawback?  Look at a map.  The roundabout flight would be about 3000 miles just to reach the entrance of the Persian Gulf.  From there Israeli planes would have to fly another 1000 miles to their targets.  Multiple in air refuelings would be necessary.  The flight time alone before the planes began their attacks would be 7-8 hours (exhausting to the pilots) and then they would have to fly back, perhaps in damaged planes.  More problematic still, such a strike could not be a surprise.  The Iranians would know that the planes are coming hours before they arrived.  All their air defenses and fighter squadrons would be on alert and already flying CAPs.  The tired IAF pilots would have to fly right into alert, ready and fresh air defenses.  Losses would be unacceptably high.  The IAF tankers would have to orbit off the Iranian coast to the south and would themselves become lucrative targets—the destruction of an Israeli tanker would mean the loss of the planes it would have to refuel on the return flight.  These planes alone would thus require a huge air escort, which itself would require more tanker planes and so on.  U.S. F-15s flew long, heavily refueled bombing missions over Afghanistan amounting to 2000-3000 miles one way and back.  But that is still shorter than the Israeli planes would have to fly, and over Afghanistan there was no threat from AA or fighter aircraft and U.S. forces were on the ground to rescue pilots.  There were also emergency landing options. An Israeli strike force would have a longer route, into the teeth of ready, prepared and elaborate defenses, with no safety net.  Basically impossible.  Verdict:  No chance.

Attack Route Over Jordan and Saudi Arabia:  This option avoids the problems of dealing with the U.S. over Iraq, but still amounts to wrecking Israel’s peace treaty with Jordan, and inviting a war with Saudi Arabia.  Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia have modern Western air defenses and Western fighters (F-16s in Jordan, F-15 and Tornadoes in Saudi Arabia).  True the IAF managed this in 1981 against Iraq’s Osirik reactor, but the Israeli strike force was small (only 14 planes) and the operation was a complete surprise.  This time, both the Saudis and Jordanians will be looking for such a move, they have the means to wreck it, and the Israeli attack force would be too large not to notice.  Despite all these problems, this is probably the most likely means of attack absent an explicit American green light over Iraq, which in fact, Israel will never get.  Therefore, this strike, for all its problems is the overall most likely option for the Israelis.  Verdict:  Small chance Israel would do this if desperate. 

Attack Route Over Turkey:  There is zero chance that the Turks will give permission for an Israeli overflight.  There is zero chance Israel would provoke a war with Turkey by attempting such an overflight without Turkish permission.  Therefore…Verdict:  Zero chance.

Direct Strike Across Jordan and Iraq:  This makes the most sense militarily.  Israel could mount an effective one time strike with its 125 capable strike aircraft (and probably a much smaller number) escorted by a one or two dozen F-15 air superiority fighters, depending on the strike packages chosen.  In-air refueling would be unnecessary.  The operation would be over in a few hours, Israeli losses would be light.  The effectiveness of the attack would be modest, not sufficient to wreck Iran’s nuke program, but enough to set it back for years.  However, neither Jordan or the U.S. will permit the transit of Israeli fighters, and Israel will not push a force into this airspace without permission.  From the U.S. perspective, in the unlikely event the President should decide to allow a transit, and Jordan could be accommodated, it would behoove the U.S. to allow Israel to mount a sustained strike  (option 5) because the U.S. will be widely blamed and condemned for allowing any Israeli strike, so why not allow a more effective operation when the U.S. is going to be blamed anyway?  The only reason not to go to option 5 is to assuage Jordan, in the highly unlikely event it would go along with such an arrangement.  Since Jordan could only be accomdated, if at all, with a one time no-refuel strike, their is a slightly greater chance that this option would be used as opposed to a sustained strike.  What does slightly better than zero chance mean?  Verdict:  Very, very, very, extremely low chance.

So there you have it—all of Israel’s possible options.  None are any good, therefore, there is next to no chance that Israel will ever mount a pre-emptive strike on Iran.  The speculation is good fun, but that’s all it is.

Shah Ismail and his wannabe successor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

August 22 is just another date on most calendars but in Sunni ...   more »

Seymour Hersh adds yet another unnecessary chapter to the endless discussion about what to do about Iran in the current ...   more »

The Washington Post's Jackson Diehl, continuing to report from Iran, follows his clearheaded column of a few day ago ...   more »

In "Deft Demagoguery in Iran" Jackson Diehl suggests that the unpopular Iranian regime (see my post earlier today "The ...   more »

In this month's Commentary Magazine, Edward  Luttwak, a noted and experienced military/foreign policy analyst/author weighs in on the Iran situation ...   more »

The following comes from a subscriber only (and expensive) financial advisory service to which I subscribe.  It discusses the state ...   more »

Clever Canadian columnist Mark Steyn ("Facing Down Iran") has a grim, tightly argued, and as always with him, slightly humorous article on the Iran situation.  It's long, but worth the read.  Bottom line according to Steyn: there are only bad choices and worse choices--better to take the bad ones.  I'm not sure I completely agree with Steyn's extremely harsh assessment of Iran, or the inevitablility of disaster if they acquire nuclear weapons.  Steyn also doesn't say how to divest Iran of their nukes or their government other than (presumably) bombing them.  He specifically rules out occupying that nation.  But you should have a reasonable chance of meeting your objectives by bombing, and I'm not sure that is the case here. 

Steyn would say under the circumstances you have to try anyway.  I'm not sure I'm there yet, but it's more food for thought. 

The SUMRG is a new elite Iranian unit preparing to attack American interests in the case of a US attack. ...   more »

Washington is currently in a couple of media and legal uproars over supposed intelligence leaks to the press--one involving Dick ...   more »

Mark Helprin is one of America's great novelists.  His "A Soldier of the Great War" is one of the best ...   more »

Iran's announcement yesterday that it succeeded in enriching uranium to 3.5 percent purity from a cascade of 164 centrifuges, ought ...   more »

With all the incessant talk (including on this website) about possible Israeli preemptive attacks on Iran, few consider ...   more »

An Israeli expert has cast doubt on Iranian claims of a new super radar evading missile, noting that it may well be just a big bluff.  I said something similar several days ago, but I'm not a missile expert--just somebody who suspects BS when he hears it.  Especially from the mullahs in Iran.

Does this mean the Iranian claims are untrue.  No.  But without further information it would be foolish for Israel or America to worry a whole lot, much let the announcement affect policy.

Today's front page above the fold headline in the Washington Post "Attacking Iran May Trigger Terrorism" is something like a ...   more »

Iran claims to have developed and test fired a new "stealth" ballistic missile that can avoid radars and anti-missile systems.  ...   more »

The headline in the Washington Post says "Security Council Pressures Iran" in reporting on the Security Council's "nonbinding statement" to ...   more »

You have to be a real cynic to look askance at the opening of American talks with Iran over the ...   more »

At the website tradesports.com you can seemingly bet on just about anything, much like in Britain or Vegas.  According ...   more »

It's hard to figure out exactly what former Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon said during a Hudson Institute (a Washington ...   more »

Arrow missile during test launch.

If there remained any doubt that Israel did not intend to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, an ...   more »

Wednesday terrorists destroyed one of Shia Islam's holiest sites, the Askariya shrine in Sammara, a town about 40 miles ...   more »

In Slate Fred Kaplan weighs in on the Iran dilemma to criticize the State Department's latest policy moves.  I like ...   more »

This item comes via IMRA (their sources noted within):

U.S. REVISES ASSESSMENT ON IRAN'S NUKES


WASHINGTON [MENL] -- The United ...   more »